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Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management in U.S. Banks 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Business decision making depends on financial reporting quality. In identifying the drivers of 
financial reporting quality, proxied by earnings management (EM), prior literature has drawn 
attention to the association between corporate EM practices and commitment to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). Empirical evidence, however, provides inconclusive results regarding the 
direction of this association. Using simultaneous equations, we examine the bi-directional CSR-
EM relationship in U.S. commercial banks. We demonstrate that, although banks that engage in 
EM practices are also actively involved in CSR, the reverse relationship is not significant. We 
provide implications for investors, analysts, business participants and regulators. 
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1. Introduction 
A few years ago, Lehman Brothers and Bear, Stearns & Co. Inc. were characterized as the most 
“prestigious”, “respected” and “durable” banks on Wall Street (Norton, 2011, p. 440, 448). They 
were also considered to be among America’s most admired investment banks since they 
occupied the top two positions within this industry sector in Fortune magazine’s 2007 Most 
Admired survey (Fortune, 2007)1. A few months later, both banks were on the verge of collapse 
having been accused of poor-quality financial reporting which misled users of their financial 
information regarding their financial health (Jones, 2011a). These two episodes raise serious 
research questions about whether CSR and the quality of financial reporting are somehow 
associated and whether this association facilitates the decision-making processes of business 
organizations.  
While previous studies have substantiated that CSR is associated with the quality of 
financial reporting, as proxied by the intensity of earnings management (EM) practices2 (see, e.g. 
Chih, Shen, and Kang, 2008; Prior, Surroca, and Tribo, 2008), empirical findings remain 
inconclusive with regard to whether commitment to CSR has a positive or negative impact on the 
quality of financial reporting (see, e.g. Chih et al., 2008) and vice versa. Given the diversity of 
findings and the importance of this relationship for academics and market participants, more 
research is needed (Kim, Park, and Wier, 2012). 
In this vein, we explore the bi-directional CSR-EM relationship by focusing on the U.S. 
commercial banking industry. Banks constitute pivotal and indispensable institutions for the 
                                                 
1 A number of studies have, however, underscored that the Fortune magazine’s Most Admired survey and other CSR 
ranking lists, such as the Newsweek environmental reputation list, may suffer from a financial halo effect which 
posits that broader CSR perceptions are possibly influenced by corporate financial performance (Brown and Perry, 
1994; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Guidry and Patten, 2010; Rozenzweig, 2009). 
2 Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) define earnings management (EM) as occurring “when managers use judgment 
in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports either to mislead some stakeholders 
about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on 
reported accounting numbers.”  
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operation of businesses and the broader economy as a whole (Scholtens, 2006; 2009). The 
intermediating, financing and pricing activities of banks play a fundamental role in the allocation 
of capital and in what is broadly perceived as development and prosperity (Levine, 2004). Most 
banks appear to be committed to CSR activities, are included in the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Index (DJSI)3 and participate in groups that have established strict principles to ensure their 
involvement in socially-responsible investment activities (such as the Equator Principles group4). 
Interestingly though, a considerable number of them have been sanctioned for being involved in 
socially-irresponsible practices (Heal, 2008). Some high-profile banks have been publicly 
denounced for gender discrimination, insider trading, fake bids, rigged auctions, money 
laundering, illegal use of confidential information, conflicts of interest and for financing 
companies involved in “sinful” activities (ibid.). Moreover, in the financial reporting realm, 
banks have been more prone to EM practices than non-financial organizations (Greenawalt and 
Sinkey, 1988). Their diversified financial operations and products, such as derivative financial 
instruments (Heilpern, Haslam, and Andersson, 2009; Lewis, 2009), are characterized by great 
opacity and information asymmetry (Furfine, 2001; Levine, 2004; Mulbert, 2009), which 
essentially complicates their financial reporting processes (Hatherly and Kretzschmar, 2011) and 
makes EM practices less discernible to vigilant stakeholders and analysts (Morgan, 2002). 
Against this background, we employ a sample of 116 listed commercial banks in the U.S. 
during a five-year period (2003-2007) to examine whether commitment to CSR activities has any 
relationship to the quality of financial reporting. We estimate a simultaneous equations system 
                                                 
3 Membership of the DJSI is acclaimed as an indication of leadership in terms of corporate sustainability. The DJSI 
uses the “best-in-class” approach by selecting the top 30 percent of companies in a specific industry based on 
sustainability criteria. 
4  Launched in 2003, the Equator Principles constitute a credit risk management framework for determining, 
assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project finance transactions (http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about; accessed on November 16, 2012). 
 4
by employing a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression method to control for any endogeneity 
problems. We measure a bank’s CSR commitment by externally-determined ratings provided by 
the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) database which has been extensively used in CSR 
research (see, e.g. Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011). By using KLD ratings we avoid 
any possible self-imposed bias in defining and measuring a bank’s CSR commitment. Following 
prior research, we measure EM by using both loan loss provisions (LLPs) and realized securities 
gains and losses (RSGLs) as a proxy for capturing bank managers’ discretionary decisions to 
manipulate earnings. We choose these measures over the alternative, the accruals choices 
approach, since it is apparently more difficult to determine discretionary choices if the latter is 
used (Beatty, Keand, and Petroni, 2002). 
Our findings suggest that banks engaged in EM practices also tend to be deeply involved 
in CSR activities. Moreover, we show that the reverse relationship is not significant, i.e. that the 
degree of a bank’s commitment to CSR is not associated with the quality of financial reporting. 
We demonstrate that, in the case of the U.S. banking sector, a one-directional association 
emerges, as we find that EM is a significant determinant of CSR. In light of these findings, we 
contribute to the extant literature by providing insights into the workings of an indispensable 
component of the operation of the U.S. economy – the commercial banking sector – which is 
characterized by a distinctive tendency to engage in EM practices and by a high level of 
participation in CSR. By deciphering the intertwining nature of EM and CSR in the case of the 
banking industry, we fill an important gap in the literature and contribute to the framework for 
decoding aspects of complex decision-making processes.  
Our work is also distinct in that, while previous studies use cross-industry and cross-
country datasets (e.g. Chih et al., 2008 studied 46 countries, and Prior et al., 2008 studied 26 
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countries), our study focuses on the (highly influential at an international level) U.S. banking 
sector. In this way, we aim to reduce the interference of any potential “noise” due to diverse 
environments and the operationalization of both CSR and EM proxies. Additionally, whilst 
previous studies have examined either the impact of EM on CSR (Prior et al., 2008) or the 
impact of CSR on EM (Chih et al., 2008), we provide a more comprehensive understanding of 
the CSR-EM relationship by bringing to the fore the element of reverse causality.   
Our findings have important implications for shareholders, investors and analysts who 
may consider CSR as an expression of “ethical” investing and a possible reflection of the quality 
of financial reporting. These groups should be very cautious in relying on CSR information for a 
banking industry analysis, since CSR is found to be driven by EM and, at the same time, banks’ 
CSR engagement is found to have no significant impact on EM. Additionally, through EM 
practices, managers may succeed in achieving both optimal levels of profitability and a high 
CSR record. In this manner, they may improve their personal reputation capital which enables 
them to claim increased benefits and rewards, better contracts, and board interlocks – often to the 
detriment of their organization’s interests. Lastly, regulators should take into account the positive 
impact of EM on CSR and should consider the reformulation of existing CSR incentive plans, 
connecting them to frameworks for bank manager benefits and rewards. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We review the relevant literature and 
explore the relationship between EM and CSR in the section captioned “Understanding the 
theoretical underpinnings of the EM-CSR relationship”. In the next section, “Research design”, 
we describe the sample selection procedure and our research design. In the “Empirical findings” 
section, we report the empirical findings and detail our robustness checks. Finally, in the last 
section, we present the conclusions drawn from our analysis. 
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2. Theoretical underpinnings of the EM-CSR relationship 
This section reviews the theoretical frameworks that can be drawn upon to understand the 
interdependencies between EM and CSR. Divergent yet valuable insights into aspects of this 
complex relationship are provided by various perspectives including legitimacy, social norm, 
stakeholder and signaling theories. For instance, according to the legitimacy approach, EM has a 
positive impact on CSR. Based on social norm theory, EM is negatively associated with CSR 
and vice versa. According to the stakeholder perspective, CSR has a positive impact on EM and, 
finally, in light of the signaling framework, CSR is seen as dissociated from EM. These 
perspectives are analyzed in the following paragraphs. 
The legitimacy approach brings to the fore the concept of organizational legitimacy, 
which is understood as a generalized perception that the actions of an entity should be desirable 
within the prevailing system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). 
Entities enjoy legitimacy insofar as they demonstrate that their activities are congruent with 
broad societal acceptations (Castello and Lozano, 2011; Dawkins and Fraas, 2011; Patten, 2002; 
Woodward, Edwards, and Birkin, 1996). Organizational legitimacy can effectively be managed 
through management strategies (Reverte, 2009). In fact, the successful operation of economic 
entities is, to a significant extent, dependent on managers’ ability to respond to various 
legitimation threats and challenges (Suchman, 1995).  
Engagement in CSR activities, which represent a well-established system of socially-
endorsed behavior (Jahdi and Acikdilli, 2009; Jones, 2011b; Vanhamme and Grobben, 2009), 
constitute effective tactics deployed by managers to confer legitimacy upon their organizations 
(Hahn and Kuhnen, 2013; Mahjoub and Khamoussi, 2013; Pellegrino and Lodhia, 2012). Firms 
use CSR practices to manage or manipulate the informational needs of the various powerful 
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stakeholder groups in society (such as employees, stockholders, nongovernmental agencies and 
the general public) so as to gain their support, which is required for survival (Gray, Kouhy, and 
Lavers, 1995). 
Organizational legitimacy is, however, undermined when managers deviate from 
accepted financial reporting practices in pursuit of their own interests (Jones, 2011a). Previous 
research draws attention to managers’ efforts to demonstrate improved measurements of 
profitability through EM practices, in order to secure their personal economic incentives (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1999; Jones, 2011a; Rahmawati and Dianita, 2011; Walker, 2013). Scholtens and 
Kang (2013), for instance, argue that managers pursue their own interests by reporting profits in 
financial statements that do not exhibit an accurate picture of the true economic situation of the 
firm. In the same vein, Sun, Salama, Hussainey, and Habbash (2010) argue that some managers 
are susceptible to taking discretionary actions regarding reported income in order to maximize 
their own benefit. Hence, EM activities are conceptualized as opportunistic practices through 
which managers inflate earnings to meet budget goals in order to increase their own 
compensation (Hong and Andersen, 2011). Interestingly, managers are also motivated to present 
decreased profits, for instance through deferring income or presenting “big bath” restructuring 
charges, when it is not possible to meet the earnings target for a particular year (Guidry, Leone, 
and Rock, 1999) or when caps on bonus awards have been established (Holthausen, Larcker, and 
Sloan, 1995).  
EM is broadly interpreted as a latent threat and an undesired practice, which could 
potentially result in devastating effects in the long-run if relevant suspicions, signaled and 
inflamed by various sources and events, go public (Dechow and Skinner, 2000). The 
dissemination of relevant information often triggers extensive scrutiny by stakeholders, the 
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media, academics and politicians 5 , which paves the way for litigation proceedings against 
deviant firms (Dechow, Ge, and Schrand, 2010) and generates negative press coverage (Chen, 
Patten, and Roberts, 2008; Dedoulis, 2006; Moerman and Van Der Laan, 2005).  
Previous research demonstrates that managers who act in pursuit of private benefits by 
distorting earnings information are more motivated to engage in CSR activities to protect their 
positions (Prior et al., 2008). In a similar vein, Barnea and Rubin (2010) maintain that corporate 
insiders often seek to over-invest in CSR in pursuit of personal benefits. Thus, legitimacy theory 
sheds light upon managerial behaviors and motives by suggesting that bank managers who are 
energetically involved in EM activities, with a view to demonstrate improved representations of 
their organization’s profitability, pre-emptively resort to CSR activities (Hahn and Kuhnen, 
2013; Mahjoub and Khamoussi, 2013; Pellegrino and Lodhia, 2012) to divert attention from 
questionable financial reporting processes.  
Insights into the CSR-EM relationship are also provided by social norm theory (Akerlof, 
1980; Romer, 1984). This perspective draws attention to how endorsed patterns of behavior 
affect economic attitudes. Economic behavior is dependent on the beliefs of the community 
(Romer, 1984), which constitute the main motivational mechanisms for market participants 
(Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Kim and Venkatachalam, 2011). Accordingly, CSR is 
conceptualized as the prevailing code of endorsed corporate attitudes (Chen et al., 2008; 
Moerman and Van Der Laan, 2005) which can be so internalized by business participants that 
conformity is seen as a moral or ethical obligation that may override the profit motive (Suder, 
2005).  
                                                 
5 These groups may not be directly affected but are nevertheless able to advance arguments that could weaken the 
firm’s social legitimacy. 
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Economic attitudes adhering to accepted codes of corporate behavior are also 
characterized by a significant reduction in the acceptance of questionable financial reporting 
practices (Leventis, Hasan, and Dedoulis, 2013). Hence, with regard to managers’ motives and 
purposes, social norm theory suggests that CSR and EM are antithetical practices that are 
negatively associated, i.e. the more a bank is engaged in CSR practices, the less it will be 
involved in questionable accounting practices. The conceptualization provided by social norm 
theory assists us in understanding the managerial purposes and behaviors underlying the reverse 
relationship. In this sense, bank managers actively involved in EM practices have not 
internalized the endorsed norms associated with corporate social responsibility, and, therefore, 
they neglect CSR or develop indifferent attitudes towards such practices.  
The stakeholder framework also sheds light on the CSR-EM connection. Stakeholder 
theory is concerned with how an organization manages its stakeholders (i.e. all groups or parties 
who are influenced by and/or who influence the organization) (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle, 
and Wood, 1997). Managers make decisions taking into account the interests of all the firm’s 
stakeholders (Jensen, 2010) and identify the priorities of the stakeholders and the information 
that should be disclosed to each one (Gray, Dey, Owen, Evans, and Zadek, 1997). Within the 
context of stakeholder theory, CSR practices are seen as part of the “dialogue between the 
company and its stakeholders” and a very “successful means of negotiating these relationships” 
(Gray et al., 1995, p. 53).  
However, diverse and often competing stakeholder interests do create tensions which are 
inevitably reflected in corporate financial reporting (Bowen, Johnson, Shevlin, and Shores, 1992; 
Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, and De Colle, 2010). Operating within a context of diverse 
stakeholder pressures, managers are also incentivized to employ questionable accounting 
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methods to influence stakeholder perceptions regarding firm performance (Bowen et al., 1992). 
Alternatively, when managers attempt to serve multiple stakeholder objectives, the information 
asymmetry is high and, therefore, stakeholders do not have sufficient resources, incentives or 
access to information to monitor managers’ actions (Richardson, 2000). In turn, this information 
asymmetry gives rise to the practice of EM (Jensen, 2010). Hence, stakeholder theory provides 
insights into managerial purposes and behaviors by suggesting that bank managers who engage 
in CSR activities to negotiate diverse stakeholder interests are also involved in EM practices.   
Finally, an alternative view of the CSR-EM relationship is provided by a synthesis of 
elements of legitimacy and signaling theories (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, and Reutzel, 2011). One 
of the ways through which organizational legitimacy could be attained is by signaling firms’ 
unobserved qualities to third parties. Due to imperfect information, market participants 
(receivers) are not always aware of crucial internal information (signals) about corporate 
practices, and, therefore, the former’s decision-making ability is essentially inhibited. Thus, 
managers (signalers) are incentivized to communicate signals which relate to adherence to CSR 
norms, in order to confer legitimacy upon their organization.  
According to this perspective, certain banks actively invest in CSR to project their 
superior type (Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari, 2008) in terms of social responsiveness 
criteria. By pointing out their distinctive CSR accomplishments, these banks achieve an 
advantageous position which is difficult for the rest of the industry to imitate. Hence, by bringing 
to the fore the signaling of unobserved CSR qualities as a central managerial motive, this 
framework suggests that a bank’s engagement in CSR activities is unrelated to the advancement 
or degradation of the organization’s financial reporting quality and, therefore, the intensity of 
CSR engagement has no impact on involvement in EM practices. 
 11
3. Research design 
3.1 Data collection procedure 
Our sample consists of 116 commercial banks listed in the U.S. during the five-year 
period 2003-2007.6 Following prior studies (e.g., Anandarajan, Hasan, and McCarthy, 2007; 
Leventis, Dimitropoulos, and Anandarajan, 2011), we exclude development banks, cooperative 
banks, import-export banks, investment banks and commercial banks with incomplete data from 
the sampling frame. Our sample comprises 580 firm-year observations. 
We collect accounting data for each sample bank from the Datastream database. We also 
obtain data on each bank’s CSR activities from an annual statistical database of companies’ 
environmental, social and governance performance, rated by Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini (KLD) 
Research & Analytics, Inc.7 
 
3.2 Measuring earnings management 
 Prior research has measured EM in several ways (see Dechow et al., 2010, for details). In 
this study, however, we measure EM using both the LLPs and RSGLs recorded by the banks in 
our sample for several reasons. First, the U.S. GAAP8 for accounting for both LLPs and RSGLs 
during the financial crisis give banks considerable discretion to manage their earnings. Second, 
prior research suggests that both LLPs and RSGLs are used by commercial banks to manage 
                                                 
6 We collect data up until 2007 for three reasons. First, the KLD database only has rich data on ratings of corporate 
social responsibility for the period 2003-2007. Second, the KLD database has few banks after 2007 so to include 
observations for the years subsequent to 2007 would drastically reduce the sample size. Third, to include 
observations for the years subsequent to 2007 may contaminate our results because of potential effects from the 
financial crisis which started in the U.S. in December 2007 (see Cornett, McNutt, and Tehranian, 2009, p. 413). 
7 KLD Research & Analysis, Inc. was taken over by the RiskMetrics Group (RMG) in 2010. 
8 For example, during the financial crisis, accounting for LLPs under U.S. GAAP was based on an incurred loss 
model (Barth and Landsman, 2010), whereby a bank provides for loan loss only if there is objective evidence to 
suggest that a loan has been impaired. As a consequence, a bank would not necessarily provide for loan loss based 
on external factors such as the bursting of the real estate bubble. Though such an event suggests that many 
homeowners might default on their loans (indicating a loss in the value of the loans), a bank would still not make 
any loan loss provisioning. 
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earnings (Anandarajan et al., 2007; Beatty et al., 2002; Cornett et al., 2009). Third, they are the 
most commonly used means of estimating EM in banking-specific studies (Kanagaretnam, 
Krishnan, and Lobo, 2010; Leventis et al., 2011). 
 According to Cornett et al. (2009), LLPs are the main tool used by banks to manage their 
earnings. LLPs are an expense item reported on the income statement reflecting bank managers’ 
current period assessment of the level of future loan losses. As managers increase LLPs, the net 
income decreases and vice versa. LLPs capture expected future losses that will occur if a 
borrower does not repay the bank in accordance with a loan contract. Regulators of the banking 
industry view accumulated LLPs, the loan loss allowance (LLA) account on the balance sheet, as 
a type of capital that can be used to absorb losses during bad times. If the LLA balance of a bank 
exceeds its expected loan losses, the bank can absorb more unexpected losses without failing and 
imposing losses on the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Conversely, if the LLA of a 
bank is less than expected losses, the bank’s equity capital will be reduced if and when the 
expected loan losses materialize. This implies that the bank’s capital ratio can overstate its ability 
to absorb unexpected losses. According to Cornett et al. (2009), LLPs consist of two 
components: the first component is a non-discretionary that brings LLA to an acceptable level; 
the second component is discretionary in nature and it is closely regulated (ibid.). 
 A realized gain or loss on available-for-sale securities (RSGLs) is the difference between 
the most recent mark-to-market price and the proceeds from the sale or redemption of the 
security. A gain occurs when the proceeds from the security sold are greater than the most recent 
mark-to-market price. In contrast, a loss occurs when the proceeds are less than the most recent 
mark-to-market price. U.S. GAAP require the recognition of certain assets and liabilities, 
particularly financial instruments, at fair value, with some changes in fair values recognized in 
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income. The fair values are estimates made by management, which affords managers the 
opportunity to manipulate these values to meet their own objectives (Barth and Landsman, 
2010). 9  In addition, RSGL is an outcome of a managerial discretional decision to sell an 
investment security to increase or decrease earnings, which cannot be subsequently challenged 
by auditors, regulators, or shareholders (Cornett et al., 2009). Because RSGL is an unregulated 
and unaudited discretionary management action, it serves as another avenue for management to 
smooth or manage earnings (ibid., p. 414). 
In measuring EM, we follow both Beatty et al. (2002) and Cornett et al. (2009) by 
estimating the discretionary LLP. Specifically, we estimate fixed-effects ordinary least-squares 
(OLS) regression and remove any influential observation by employing Cook’s (1977) distance 
criterion. Thus, we estimate the following model10: 
 
LLP/TLit = at + b1SIZEit + b2NPLit + b3LLRit + b4REALit + b5COMit 
+ b6CONit + εit              (1) 
where: 
LLP/TL = Loan loss provisions deflated by total loans, 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets, 
NPL = Ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, 
LLR = Ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans, 
REAL = Ratio of real-estate loans to total loans, 
COM = Ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total loans, and 
CON = Ratio of consumer and installment loans to total loans. 
 
                                                 
9 Banks use available-for-sale investment securities to make net income less volatile or to affect regulatory capital 
through the timing of the realization of fair value gains or losses. This is more often true for the common stock 
component of those securities classified as available-for-sale securities, and not so often for the held-to-maturity 
component. 
10 Our categorization of the loans differs from Beatty et al. (2002) and Cornett et al. (2009) since these studies 
employ data derived from the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank and Sheshenoff databases. We rely on Datastream 
where loans are categorized into real estate, commercial and industrial, and consumer and instalment loans.  
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According to Cornett et al. (2009), the error term of Equation (1), whose estimates are 
reported in Appendix A, is the discretionary component of LLP, DLLP. Since our measure of 
EM (defined below) is standardized by total assets, we transform the error term and define DLLP 
as: 
DLLPit = (εit*LOANSit)/ASSETSit              (2) 
where: 
LOANS = Total loans, and 
ASSETS = Total assets 
 
 To determine discretionary RSGL (DRSGL), we again follow both Beatty et al. (2002) 
and Cornett et al. (2009). Thus, we run a fixed-effects OLS regression and remove influential 
observations by employing Cook’s (1977) distance criterion in the model below: 
 
RSGLit = at + b1SIZEit + b2URSGLit + εit             (3) 
where: 
RSGL = Realized security gains and losses deflated by total assets, 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets, and 
URSGL = Unrealized security gains and losses deflated by total assets. 
 
The regression estimates of Equation 3 are also reported in Appendix A. The 
discretionary part of RSGL (DRSGL) is the error term of Equation (3). Finally, again following 
both Beatty et al. (2002) and Cornett et al. (2009), we define EM in such a manner that higher 
(lower) levels of EM increase (decrease) earnings. Consequently, higher levels of LLPs decrease 
earnings, whereas higher levels of RSGLs increase earnings. In other words, the residuals of 
Equations (1) and (3) capture the relevant discretionary decisions with regard to possible over-
estimations of earnings through: i) underestimation of LLPs (Beatty et al., 2002, p. 553); or ii) 
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overestimation of security gains and/or underestimation of security losses (ibid.). In this manner, 
the residuals of these equations constitute metrics of what is referred to by prior literature on 
non-financial firms as “abnormal accruals” (ibid.). Accordingly, we define EM for each sample 
bank as the difference between its discretionary RSGLs and discretionary LLPs (Cornett et al., 
2009). Thus: 
 
EMit = DRSGLit – DLLPit               (4) 
 
3.3 Measuring corporate social responsibility 
 We use the externally-determined ratings for CSR activities provided by KLD Research 
& Analytics, Inc. The KLD ratings for CSR-related items are derived from various sources such 
as government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, global media publications, annual 
reports, regulatory filings, proxy statements and company disclosures. As in prior studies (see, 
e.g., Benson and Davidson, 2010; Berman, Wicks, Kotha, and Jones, 1999; Ghoul et al., 2011; 
Hillman and Keim, 2001), we use the KLD ratings to avoid any self-imposed bias regarding the 
definition and measurement of CSR. 
To construct an overall measure of a bank’s commitment to CSR, we use the KLD ratings 
for six of the seven major categories of qualitative issue areas, namely: community, diversity, 
employee, environment, human rights, and product (service) quality. We consider these 
qualitative issue areas to be more relevant to banks.11 For each category, KLD assigns a binary 
(0/1) rating to a set of concerns and strengths (see Appendix B for details). Thus, for each 
category, KLD assigns a rating of “1” indicating either a strength or a cause for concern for each 
                                                 
11 As in prior studies (e.g., Benson and Davidson, 2010; Ghoul et al., 2011), we exclude KLD’s category of 
corporate governance since this aspect of banks is highly regulated, especially following the passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and, as such, there might not be any systematic difference among the sample banks. 
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organization for each category. On the other hand, if it assigns a rating of “0”, this indicates that 
an organization does not meet the required criteria to merit either a strength or a concern. 
Following Garcia-Castro, Arino, and Canela (2010) and Hillman and Keim (2001), we compute 
a score for each bank by totaling its positive ratings for strengths and negative ratings for 
concerns in a given year. We then add together the scores for each bank in each category to 
obtain an overall CSR score. We interpret a higher CSR score as an indication of a bank’s greater 
commitment to CSR. 
 
3.4 Empirical model 
To test the relationship between CSR and EM, we estimate a linear simultaneous 
equations system of two cross-sectional models since prior studies (Labelle, Gargouri, and 
Francoeur, 2010; Prior et al., 2008) suggest that CSR and EM might be endogenously 
determined. Hence, to put both EM and the other determinants of CSR on the right-hand side of 
an equation having CSR as its dependent variable would lead to biased and inconsistent OLS 
estimates (Gujarati, 1995; Koutsoyiannis, 1977). Indeed, recent CSR studies emphasize the 
importance of controlling for endogeneity problems (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010; Hillman and 
Keim, 2001). Gujarati (1995) and Koutsoyiannis (1977) recommend addressing a possible 
endogeneity problem by estimating a 2SLS regression and this method has been used in several 
studies (see, e.g., Owusu-Ansah, Leventis, and Caramanis, 2010). 
In the first stage, the endogenous variable EM is regressed against exogenous variables, 
whose selection is dictated by prior studies. Thus, we include in Equation (5): corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), profitability (EBIT) and growth opportunities (MB) (Labelle et al., 2010); 
bank size (SIZE), leverage (LEV) and capital risk (CAP) (Cornett et al., 2009); audit firm (AUD) 
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(Gul, Sun, and Tsui, 2003); auditor change (AUDC) (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1996); and 
credit risk (LCO) and loss (LOSS) (Kanagaretnam et al., 2010). Thus, we specify the functional 
form of the first-stage regression as: 
 
EMij = αo + α1CSRij + α2EBITij + α3SIZEij + α4AUDij + α5LEVij + α6MBij + α7AUDCij 
 + α8CAPij + α9LCOij + α10LOSSij + YEARSij
j
j

15
11
  + uij          (5) 
where: 
EM = Earnings management measure, 
CSR = Corporate social responsibility measure, 
EBIT = Earnings before extraordinary items and taxes deflated by lagged total assets, 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets, 
AUD = Dummy coded 1 if a bank is a client of a Big-4 audit firm or 0 otherwise, 
LEV = Total debt to common equity, 
MB = Market-to-book value of equity, 
AUDC = Dummy coded 1 if a bank changed its external auditor or 0 otherwise, 
CAP = Ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) to the minimum required 
regulatory capital, 
LCO = Net loan charge offs over lagged total loans, and 
LOSS = Dummy coded 1 if a bank’s net income is positive or 0 otherwise. 
 
In the second stage, CSR is regressed on the fitted values of EM (FT_EM), which is 
derived from the first-stage regression and the actual values of the exogenous variables, whose 
selection is based on prior studies while taking into consideration the particularities of banks. 
Specifically, we include in Equation (6): EBIT (Orlitzky, Schmidt, and Rynes, 2003); SIZE 
(Amato and Amato, 2007; Scholtens, 2009); MB (Benson and Davidson, 2010); LEV (Gainet, 
2010); and INTA (Surroca, Tribo, and Waddock, 2010). Prior et al. (2008) suggest that risk 
should be controlled for in any model that tests the CSR-EM relationship. Therefore, we control 
for capital risk by including CAP in Equation (6) (see also Scholtens, 2009). Following 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2010), we also control for credit risk by including different types of loans 
(usually offered by commercial banks) deflated by total loans. The loans include consumer and 
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installment loans (CONS), real estate mortgage loans (REAL), and commercial and industrial 
loans (COM). Thus, we estimate the following structural equation: 
 
CSRij = βo + β1FT_EMij + β2EBITij + β3SIZEij + β4MBij + β5LEVij + β6CAPij 
+ β7INTAij + β8CONSij + β9REALij + β10COMij + uij          (6) 
 
where all variables are defined as per Equation (5) except for those first introduced in Equation 
(6), which are defined as: 
FT_EM = Fitted values of the earnings management measure derived from Equation (5), 
INTA = Intangible assets deflated by total assets, 
CONS = Consumer and installment loans deflated by total loans, 
REAL = Real estate mortgage loans deflated by total loans, and 
COM = Commercial and industrial loans deflated by total loans. 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in our tests. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent 
variables. It shows that the correlation coefficient between COM and REAL is very high. 
Consequently, we include only one of these independent variables at a time in Equation (6).12 
The correlation coefficients for all other variables are lower than conventional thresholds 
(Gujarati, 1995). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Empirical findings 
4.1 Results of the 2SLS analysis 
                                                 
12 The inclusion of either variable in Equation (6) yields qualitatively similar findings. Hence, for brevity purposes, 
we report only the findings based on the model in which we include the COM variable. 
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The estimates of Equations (5) and (6) using OLS would be inconsistent if CSR and EM 
are endogenously determined, since at least some of the independent variables would be 
correlated with the error terms of the equations (Gujarati, 1995; Koutsoyiannis, 1977). To 
address any potential endogeneity problems, we estimate a 2SLS regression. Under the null 
hypothesis that CSR and EM are not endogenously determined, OLS estimates would be 
consistent and efficient, while 2SLS estimates would be consistent but inefficient. According to 
the alternative hypothesis that CSR and EM are endogenously determined, only 2SLS estimates 
would be consistent. The finding of the Hausman’s (1978) simultaneity specification test (two-
sided p-value = 0.293) suggests that the null hypothesis can be rejected. 
For Equation (5), where EM is the dependent variable, the coefficient of CSR is negative 
and not statistically significant at any conventional level. This suggests that CSR activities do not 
explain why U.S. banks indulge in EM practices. This finding is inconsistent with those of prior 
research on non-financial companies (Chih et al., 2008; Labelle et al., 2010). For the control 
variables, only EBIT and SIZE are statistically significant. EBIT is significant at the 0.01 level 
with a positive coefficient, suggesting an interrelationship between EBIT and EM practices while 
SIZE is significant at the 0.10 level, albeit with an unexpected negative sign. 
For Equation (6), where CSR serves as the dependent variable, the coefficient of EM 
(actually the fitted value of EM [FT_EM]) is statistically significant and positive. This suggests 
that banks that engage in EM practices are also actively involved in CSR activities. 
For the control variables, only EBIT is statistically significant at the 0.01 level with a 
negative sign. While this finding is inconsistent with Prior et al. (2008), it is consistent with that 
reported by Simpson and Kohers (2002). We attribute this finding to “managerial opportunism” 
(Preston and O’Bannon, 1997). Thus, when a company’s financial performance is poor, attempts 
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are made to divert attention by spending on conspicuous social programs. In light of legitimacy 
theory, we argue that low accounting earnings are probably understood by bank managers as a 
severe threat and CSR programs as a consequent defensive strategy. An alternative explanation 
suggests that when banks undertake CSR activities as a result of their engagement in EM 
practices, the expected positive effect of CSR on financial performance reverses. Prior et al. 
(2008) report a finding consistent with this alternative explanation.  
The INTA variable is significantly associated with CSR at the 0.01 level, suggesting that 
banks that have a greater proportion of their total assets in intangible assets tend to engage in 
more CSR activities. We interpret this positive relationship by synthesizing elements of 
legitimacy and signaling theories. Intangibles are considered very important resources which 
enhance organizational reputation (Lange, Lee, and Dai, 2011). However, the volume of an 
organization’s investment in intangible assets is also associated with greater risk for two reasons 
(Di Biase and D’Apolito, 2012; Durst, 2011). Firstly, intangibles increase banks’ perceived 
opacity due to the complexity associated with their valuation. Secondly, intangibles have a 
relatively low loss-absorbing capacity as their book values can hardly be monetized in the event 
of lack of liquidity and financial distress. Hence, a high investment in intangibles may 
incentivize banks to resort to CSR to strengthen their image and protect corporate intangible 
resources. 
Unsurprisingly, banks that are financially sound (CAP) by regulatory capital standards do 
engage in a considerable amount of CSR activities. Considering that CSR activities entail high 
costs, banks with available capital are in a more advantageous position to be able to implement 
CSR policies and signal their superiority. This is consistent with a finding reported by Labelle et 
al. (2010). Finally, SIZE is significant at the 0.05 level, suggesting that large banks, i.e. 
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organizations characterized by greater capacities, are more likely to engage in CSR activities. 
This finding is also consistent with those reported by prior research (Amato and Amato, 2007; 
Prior et al., 2008). 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
We check the robustness of our findings by performing several sensitivity tests. First, 
prior research suggests the existence of a potential endogeneity problem between EM and 
financial performance (measured here by EBIT [Cornett et al., 2009]), and also between CSR 
and financial performance (Garcia-Castro et al., 2010). This would require us to run a third 
equation where EBIT would be treated as an endogenous variable. Therefore, to address the 
potential endogeneity problem, we follow two approaches: (i) we exclude the EBIT variable 
from our system of equations and re-estimate the 2SLS system; and (ii) as in Labelle et al. 
(2010), we include a lagged version of the EBIT variable (EBITt-1). The findings are 
qualitatively similar to those reported earlier. 
Second, following Davidson and MacKinnon (2004, p. 336-338), we jointly test the 
hypothesis that the instruments used are valid and that the structural equation (Equation 6) is 
correctly specified (i.e., none of the excluded exogenous variables should, in fact, be included in 
the structural equation). A significant test statistic suggests either an invalid instrument(s) or an 
incorrectly specified structural equation (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2004). The test statistics for 
both Sargan’s (2  = 1.152, p-value = 0.5632), and Basmann’s (2 = 1.112, p-value = 0.5747) 
tests indicate that our instruments are valid and that Equation (6) is correctly specified. 
Third, prior research shows that EM (Kanagaretnam et al., 2010) and CSR (Prior et al., 
2008) models are sensitive to organizational size, so we assess the influence of size on our 
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findings. We perform an F-test, as suggested by Chow (1960), to determine whether the 
estimates of the full sample model are consistent across the lower and upper halves of our 
sample. We divide the full sample of banks into lower and upper halves by the median of their 
total assets. The untabulated findings of the Chow test indicate that there is no statistical 
difference in the regression estimates for SIZE between the lower (small bank) and upper (large 
bank) segments of our sample (2 -statistic = 0.05, two-sided p-value = 0.9169). Thus, SIZE has 
no disproportionate effect on our findings. 
Fourth, although the pairwise correlation coefficients reported in Table 2 do not indicate 
any multicollinearity problems in our data, the existence of a certain degree of collinearity is still 
possible. This is because one independent variable may be an approximate linear function of a 
set of several other independent variables and, also, simultaneous estimators break down in the 
face of multicollinearity (Farley and Leavitt, 1968, p. 366). Consequently, we compute a post-
estimation variance-covariance of the estimators (VCE) of the variables in Equation (6). Similar 
to the findings of the Pearson product-moment correlation procedure reported in Table 2, the 
VCE (the correlation matrix of which is not reported here) suggests that the degree of 
multicollinearity is not severe. 
Fifth, although we have selected the control variables in Equation (6) on the basis of 
findings from prior literature, we further test whether the model suffers from omitted variable 
problems. To this end, we perform a Ramsey’s (1969) Specification Error Test (RESET). The F-
test has a significance level lower than 5% (F-statistic = 1.71, p-value = 0.1932) which, 
according to Goldstein (1991), indicates no omission of any significant variable. Sixth, we test 
the impact of interest cover ratio and dividend pay-out (Beatty and Weber, 2003). The findings 
are not significant and the explanatory power of the equation is not improved. Finally, in 
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Equation (1) we follow Cornett et al. (2009) by including the NPL variable. We further test, 
similar to Beatty et al. (2002), whether NPL change (ΔNPL) makes any difference. Our 
inferences do not change.   
 
5. Conclusions 
A comparatively recent stream of the literature has shown considerable interest in understanding 
whether corporate commitment to CSR activities plays a role in the quality of financial reporting 
and vice versa (Chih et al., 2008; Heltzer, 2011; Hong and Andersen, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; 
Labelle et al., 2010; Prior et al., 2008; Scholtens and Kang, 2013). However, little emphasis has 
been placed upon investigating this bi-directional relationship in the case of the influential U.S. 
banking sector. In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, we investigate the relationship 
between CSR and EM using a sample of 116 listed U.S. commercial banks during the five-year 
period 2003-2007. 
Our analysis suggests that there is a positive association between EM and CSR, i.e. that 
bank managers who manipulate earnings tend to intensify their involvement in CSR activities. 
We interpret questionable financial reporting methods as practices instigated by managers to 
affect profitability given that their personal economic interests are often tied to corporate annual 
earnings. In line with legitimacy theory, such practices constitute latent threats to a bank’s 
credibility – with devastating effects if they go public. CSR is seen as a pre-emptive strategy 
employed by bank managers to divert attention from undesired accounting methods and to build 
a protective shield by creating a socially-responsible profile. 
The view that CSR engagement constitutes a central pre-emptive strategy for banks is 
further strengthened by our findings. Our findings demonstrate that low accounting earnings, 
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which are inevitably perceived by bank managers as a potential threat to their interests, are 
associated with intensive investment in CSR activities. Moreover, a high investment in 
intangibles, which is also characterized by great complexity in terms of valuation and low-loss 
absorbing capacity, is accompanied by a high involvement in CSR practices.     
Furthermore, our findings suggest that the extent of a bank’s engagement in CSR 
activities is not influential in determining a bank’s indulgence in EM practices. By synthesizing 
elements of legitimacy and signaling theories, we argue that, operating within markets 
characterized by imperfect information, certain banks resort to CSR practices in order to signal 
internal qualities and to build a distinct socially-responsible organizational profile. Incentivized 
by building a superior image and attaining prominence, banks deploy CSR strategies to 
differentiate themselves from other institutions in the industry, without such tactics having any 
impact on EM. Moreover, our analysis shows that banks with greater capacities in terms of size 
and available capital (CAP) are in a more privileged position to attain, maintain and reestablish 
superiority.   
Overall, our study indicates that the CSR-EM relationship is not bi-directional. This is 
demonstrated by our results which show that, while a high engagement in EM increases 
engagement in CSR, involvement in CSR does not determine EM practices. Moreover, our 
findings suggest that CSR is a pre-emptive legitimation tool deployed by bank managers, either 
to deflect attention from questionable accounting practices or to signal out unobserved qualities 
which may assist them in building a superior profile within the very competitive banking 
industry.  
The implications of our findings are particularly important for market participants and 
regulators. Shareholders, investors and analysts who tend to consider an organization’s 
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engagement in CSR activities in their financial and credit analyses should exercise extreme 
caution for a number of reasons. Firstly, bank managers may have strong incentives to exercise 
discretion with regard to accounting methods to achieve optimal levels of profitability, since 
their personal benefits may be tied to their organization’s financial performance. Such action is 
highly likely to be related to an active involvement in CSR activities, which enable managers to 
build a socially-responsive corporate profile and, in this manner, to deflect attention from 
questionable financial reporting practices. Moreover, bank managers may also be incentivized to 
employ CSR to cushion the consequences of low earnings and high investment in intangible 
assets. Secondly, CSR is found to be unrelated to EM and, therefore, CSR should not be 
perceived as an indication of a bank’s ethical disposition, which, in turn, manifests itself in the 
quality of financial reporting. 
Thirdly, market participants should take into consideration that a bank’s active 
involvement in CSR may be driven by EM practices employed to achieve optimal levels of 
profitability. Against this background, they should be aware that bank managers are highly likely 
to prioritize the CSR agenda and to potentially allocate significant resources to CSR practices, 
since accomplishing desired levels of profitability could also affect the perceptions of 
stakeholders who may accept higher investments in CSR. Fourthly, through EM practices bank 
managers might succeed in achieving both optimal levels of profitability and, at the same time, 
involvement in CSR activities which is considered desirable. By doing this, they improve their 
personal reputation capital which enables them to claim increased benefits and rewards, better 
contracts, and board interlocks (which, however, may be to the detriment of the organization’s 
stakeholders). Finally, in light of our findings, regulators should take into account the positive 
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impact of EM on CSR. They could therefore consider the reformulation of existing CSR 
incentive plans and connect them to frameworks for bank manager benefits and rewards. 
Our study has a number of limitations which, however, may inspire future research. 
Firstly, our findings cannot be generalized since the sample is both industry- and country- 
specific. For this reason, future research could explore the bi-directional CSR-EM relationship 
using cross-country data provided that the potential effects of different cultural, legal, 
institutional and accounting traditions could be adequately controlled (Kim et al., 2012). 
Secondly, due to data and specification reasons, we do not treat the EBIT variable as endogenous 
and therefore do not include a third equation in the model. Thirdly, our sample period is limited 
to the five years between 2003 and 2007. Future research may advance current understandings 
by extending the sample period chronologically. For example, panel data analysis would allow 
for an examination of the long-term connection between CSR and EM in the U.S. banking sector. 
Additionally, while we assume, in line with prior literature (Chih et al., 2008; Kim et al., 2012), 
that CSR and EM decisions are taken in a contemporaneous manner (i.e. within the same fiscal 
year) the strategic timing of relevant decisions deserves full investigation (see Petrovits, 2006).  
Given that we focus on the relationship between CSR and EM, it would also be important 
for future researchers to expand our study’s scope and explore how CSR disclosures, as part of a 
broader impression management strategy, fit into the relationship between EM and CSR ratings. 
Finally, since this type of research provides inferences of managerial motives, purposes and 
behaviors based on the statistical analysis undertaken and the theoretical perspectives adopted, 
future research could employ behavioral and organizational frameworks in order to shed further 
light on the motives and purposes with regard to managerial strategies involving CSR and EM.   
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics of Main Continuous Variables Used in Regressions 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
EM     0.000    0.0001   0.0021  -0.020     0.007 
CSR     0.166      0.000   1.666  -4.000     8.000 
EBIT     0.010   0.0104   0.005  -0.020     0.024 
SIZE   81.950   80.000 14.740 51.000 132.000 
AUD     0.653     1.000   0.477    0.000     1.000 
LEV     0.678     0.663   0.105   0.389     0.911 
MB 194.290 190.000 81.470    0.000 514.000 
AUDC     0.084     0.000   0.277    0.000     1.000 
CAP   12.630   11.000   4.410    6.000   39.000 
LCO     0.206     0.160   0.186   -0.015     0.021 
LOSS     0.017     0.000   0.131    0.000     1.000 
INTA     0.022     0.018   0.022    0.000     0.205 
CONS     0.131     0.113   0.104    0.000     0.625 
REAL     0.621     0.635   0.213    0.041     1.000 
COM     0.249     0.215   0.181    0.000     0.908 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable definition: 
EM = Earnings management measure, 
CSR = Corporate social responsibility measure, 
EBIT = Earnings before extraordinary items and taxes deflated by lagged total assets, 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets, 
AUD = Dummy coded 1 if a bank is a client of a Big-4 audit firm or 0 otherwise, 
LEV = Total debt to common equity, 
MB = Market-to-book value of equity, 
AUDC = Dummy coded 1 if a bank changed its external auditor or 0 otherwise, 
CAP = Ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) to the minimum required 
regulatory capital, 
LCO = Net loan charge offs over lagged total loans, 
LOSS = Dummy coded 1 if a bank’s net income is positive or 0 otherwise, 
INTA = Intangible assets over total assets, 
CONS = Consumer and installment loans over total loans, 
REAL = Real estate mortgage loans over total loans, and 
COM = Commercial and industrial loans over total loans. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix (p-values in parentheses) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable EM CSR EBIT SIZE AUD LEV MB AUDC CAP LCO LOSS INTA CONS REAL COM 
EM 1.000 
 
              
CSR 0.285 
(0.000) 
1.000              
EBIT 0.317 
(0.000) 
-0.135 
(0.001) 
1.000             
SIZE 0.056 
(0.193) 
0.296 
(0.000) 
0.322 
(0.000) 
1.000            
AUD 0.085 
(0.058)  
0.068 
(0.144) 
0.087 
(0.051) 
0.176 
(0.000) 
1.000           
LEV -0.000 
(0.999) 
-0.039 
(0.402) 
-0.095 
(0.022) 
0.228 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.738) 
1.000          
MB 0.143 
(0.001) 
-0.029 
(0.534) 
0.554 
(0.000) 
0.148 
(0.001) 
0.143 
(0.001) 
-0.095 
(0.027) 
1.000         
AUDC -0.047 
(0.272) 
-0.031 
(0.505) 
0.032 
(0.456) 
-0.021 
(0.631) 
-0.064 
(0.156) 
-0.016 
(0.705) 
0.012 
(0.789) 
1.000        
CAP 0.017 
(0.696) 
0.255 
(0.000) 
-0.014 
(0.736) 
-0.009 
(0.835) 
-0.106 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.744) 
-0.083 
(0.056) 
-0.015 
(0.728) 
1.000       
LCO -0.026 
(0.538) 
0.040 
(0.389) 
0.052 
(0.214) 
0.075 
(0.082) 
0.008 
(0.852) 
-.1392 
.0009 
-0.023 
(0.597) 
-0.044 
(0.302) 
-0.099 
(0.020) 
1.000      
LOSS 0.075 
(0.073) 
0.164 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.385) 
0.034 
(0.431) 
-0.046 
(0.306) 
.0361 
.3867 
0.050 
(0.242) 
0.008 
(0.857) 
-0.010 
(0.812) 
0.023 
(0.579) 
1.000     
INTA -0.018 
(0.672)  
0.1580 
(0.001) 
0.019 
(0.652) 
-0.026 
(0.552) 
0.057 
(0.202) 
-0.159 
(0.000) 
-0.249 
(0.000) 
-0.032 
(0.457) 
-0.022 
(0.606) 
0.035 
(0.407) 
-0.013 
(0.759) 
1.000    
CONS -0.131 
(0.002) 
-0.015 
(0.755) 
0.006 
(0.882) 
-0.127 
(0.003) 
0.125 
(0.005) 
-0.050 
(0.239) 
0.051 
(0.237) 
0.012 
(0.789) 
-0.105 
(0.014) 
0.029 
(0.489) 
0.026 
(0.545) 
-0.049 
(0.249) 
1.000   
REAL 0.091 
(0.028) 
-0.027 
(0.556) 
-0.042 
(0.310) 
-0.012 
(0.776) 
-0.089 
(0.046) 
0.143 
(0.001) 
-0.008 
(0.847) 
0.032 
(0.451) 
0.143 
(0.001) 
0.274 
(0.000) 
-0.033 
(0.433) 
-0.004 
(0.927) 
-0.517 
(0.000) 
1.000  
COM -0.027 
(0.519) 
0.040 
(0.389) 
0.043 
(0.301) 
0.078 
(0.069) 
0.027 
(0.547) 
-0.143 
(0.001) 
-0.024 
(0.535) 
-0.045 
(0.293) 
-0.109 
 (0.010) 
0.144 
(0.001) 
0.024 
(0.568) 
0.043 
(0.308) 
0.026 
(0.534) 
-0.870 
(0.000) 
1.000 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable definition: 
EM = Earnings management measure, 
CSR = Corporate social responsibility measure, 
EBIT = Earnings before extraordinary items and taxes deflated by lagged total assets, 
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SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets, 
AUD = Dummy coded 1 if a bank is a client of a Big-4 audit firm or 0 otherwise, 
LEV = Total debt to common equity, 
MB = Market-to-book value of equity, 
AUDC = Dummy coded 1 if a bank changed its external auditor or 0 otherwise, 
CAP = Ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) to the minimum required regulatory capital, 
LCO = Net loan charge offs over lagged total loans, 
LOSS = Dummy coded 1 if a bank’s net income is positive or 0 otherwise, 
INTA = Intangible assets over total assets, 
CONS = Consumer and installment loans over total loans, 
REAL = Real estate mortgage loans over total loans, and 
COM = Commercial and industrial loans over total loans. 
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Table 3 
Results for the 2SLS Estimation 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables
First-stage with EM dependent 
variable (Equation 5) 
_______________________________
Second-stage with CSR dependent variable 
(Equation 6) 
___________________________________________
Coef. t-Stat.  Coef. t-Stat.
Constant -0.0012 -0.75 Constant      -1.2902 -1.54 
CSR -0.0021 -1.15 FT_EM   683.1075  2.18** 
EBIT  0.1792  6.53*** EBIT -183.1661 -2.69*** 
SIZE -0.0002 -1.75* SIZE     0.0172  1.97** 
AUD  0.0003  1.55 MB     0.0035  2.22** 
LEV  0.0006  0.65 LEV    -1.2492 -1.30 
MB -0.0007 -0.92 CAP     0.1123  5.05*** 
AUDC -0.0002 -0.54 INTA   16.649  3.46*** 
CAP  0.0008  1.01 CONS     1.0514  0.86 
LCO -0.0009 -0.95 REAL   -1.0314 -1.82* 
LOSS  0.0015  1.61    
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Models: 
 
EMij = αo + α1CSRij + α2EBITij + α3SIZEij + α4AUDij + α5LEVij + α6MBij + α7AUDCij 
 + α8CAPij + α9LCOij + α10LOSSij + YEARSij
j
j

15
11
  + uij         (5) 
 
CSRij = βo + β1FT_EMij + β2EBITij + β3SIZEij + β4MBij + β5LEVij + β6CAPij + β7INTAij 
+ β8CONSij + β9REALij + β10COMij + uij          (6) 
 
Variable definition: 
EM = Earnings management measure, 
FT_EM = Fitted value of earnings management measure, 
CSR = Corporate social responsibility measure, 
EBIT = Earnings before extraordinary items and taxes deflated by lagged total assets, 
SIZE = Natural logarithm of total assets, 
AUD = Dummy coded 1 if a bank is a client of a Big-4 audit firm or 0 otherwise, 
LEV = Total debt to common equity, 
MB = Market-to-book value of equity, 
AUDC = Dummy coded 1 if a bank changed its external auditor or 0 otherwise, 
CAP = Ratio of actual regulatory capital (Tier 1 capital) to the minimum required 
regulatory capital, 
LCO = Net loan charge offs over lagged total loans, 
LOSS = Dummy coded 1 if a bank’s net income is positive or 0 otherwise, 
INTA = Intangible assets over total assets, 
CONS = Consumer and installment loans over total loans, 
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REAL = Real estate mortgage loans over total loans, and 
COM = Commercial and industrial loans over total loans. 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 44
Appendix A 
Regression Results 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables 
LLP/TL    
_______________________________
RSGL 
___________________________________________
Coef. t-Stat. Coef. t-Stat. 
Constant -.168 -1.139 .264 7.771 
SIZE .001 2.712 *** .095 8.656*** 
NPL .147 13.178***   
LLR .327 15.003***   
REAL .001 1.113   
COM -.001 -1.219   
CON .002 1.612   
URSGL   .001 .511 
     
Adj. R2 28.5% 10.8% 
    
 
 45
Appendix B 
KLD Strength and Concern Ratings 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
No. Qualitative Issue Area Strength (Positive Indicator) 
Concern 
(Negative Indicator) 
    
1. Community Charitable Giving Investment Controversies 
  Innovative Giving Negative Economic Impact 
  Non-U.S. Charitable Giving Tax Disputes 
  Support for Housing Other 
  Support for Education  
  Volunteer Programs  
  Other  
    
2. Diversity CEO Controversies 
  Promotion Non-Representation 
  Board of Directors Other 
  Work/Life Benefits  
  Women & Minority Contracting  
  Employment of the Disabled  
  Gay and Lesbian Policies  
  Other  
    
3. Employee Relations Union Relations Union Relations 
  Cash Profit Sharing Health and Safety 
  Employee Involvement Workforce Reductions 
  Health and Safety Retirement Benefit 
  Other Other 
    
4. Environment Beneficial Product and Services Hazardous Waste 
  Pollution Prevention Regulatory Problems 
  Recycling Ozone Depleting Chemicals 
  Clean Energy Substantial Emissions 
  Management Systems Agricultural Chemicals 
  Other Climate Change 
   Other 
    
5. Human Rights Indigenous Peoples Relations Burma 
  Labor Rights Labor Rights 
  Other Indigenous Peoples Relations 
   Other 
    
6. Product Quality Safety 
  R&D/Innovation Marketing/Contracting Concern 
  Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged Antitrust 
  Other Other 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: RiskMetrics Group, Inc. (2010). How to Use KLD STATS and ESG Ratings Definitions. Boston, MA: 
RiskMetrics Group, Inc.  
